Inter-industry contagion and the competitive effects of financial distress announcements: evidence from commercial banks and life insurance companies by Elijah Brewer, III & William E. Jackson, III
Inter-industry Contagion and the
Competitive Effects of Financial
Distress Announcements:  Evidence
from Commercial Banks and Life
Insurance Companies
































WP 2002-23Inter-industry contagion and the competitive effects of
financial distress announcements: evidence from




Research Department, 11th Floor
230 S. LaSalle Street
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois 60604-1413
(312) 322-5813
(312) 322-5214 - FAX
ebrewer@frbchi.org
and




University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3490
(919) 962-3214
(919) 962-2068 - FAX
wej3@unc.edu
JEL Classification Numbers: G1, G2, G21, G28
Key words: market efficiency, contagion, inter-industry, signaling, financial distress
December 2002
 
* We thank Jennifer Conrad, James Thompson, Harold Zhang, seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and the 2002 Financial Management Association meetings. The
research assistance of Erin Davis and Susan Yuska is greatly appreciated.  The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.2
Inter-Industry contagion and the competitive effects of financial distress
announcements: evidence from commercial banks and life insurance
companies
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the “inter-industry” contagion effects of financial distress
announcements by commercial banks on the stock returns of life insurance companies, and vice-
versa.  We focus on inter-industry contagion effects because the vast majority of the extant
literature about contagion has neglected this important potential cost to shareholders.  We
examine adverse information about commercial real estate portfolios from three separate sets of
announcements.
Our results provide very strong evidence of significant inter-industry shareholder wealth
effects. However, these shareholder wealth effects do not appear to be purely contagious in
nature. The wealth effects are directly linked to such factors as: geographic proximity, asset
portfolio composition, liability portfolio composition, and regulatory expectations. Thus, it
appears that the market considers both expected changes in the revenue produced by assets as
well as the cost of liabilities when determining the magnitude of shareholder wealth effects. This
helps to explain why in some instances competitors benefit from a rival firm’s financial distress
announcement. And, that this positive competitive benefit may outweigh any negative re-
evaluation effects of the announcement.  Unlike previous contagion studies, we also attempt to
evaluate the proportion of the contagion effect that is informational relative to that proportion
which is pure contagion.
JEL Classification Numbers: G1, G2, G21, G28
Key words: market efficiency, contagion, inter-industry, signaling, financial distress3
Inter-Industry contagion and the competitive effects of financial distress
announcements: evidence from commercial banks and life insurance
companies
1.  Introduction
Contagion usually refers to the spillover of the effects of shocks from one or more firms
to other firms (Kaufman, 1994).  Most studies of contagion limit their analysis to how shock
affect firms in the same industry, or “intra-industry” contagion (e.g., Aharony and Swary, 1983;
Lang and Stulz, 1992; Docking, Hirschey, and Jones, 1997; and Akhigbe and Madura, 2001).
The purpose of this paper is to explore and document the likely magnitude of “inter-industry”
contagion.  In their comprehensive study of intra-industry contagion using many individual
industries Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that if contagion is not simply an informational effect it
will impose a social cost on our economic system. If this is true for intra-industry contagion, then
the same argument must hold for inter-industry contagion as well.  We focus on inter-industry
contagion effects in this paper because the vast majority of the extant literature about contagion
has neglected its important potential cost to shareholders.
Most of the studies on contagion follow the pioneering work of Aharony and Swary
(1983) by differentiating between a “pure” contagion effect and a signaling or information-based
contagion effect. An example of a pure contagion effect would be the negative effects of a bank
failure spilling over to other banks regardless of the cause of the bank failure. And, an example
of a signaling contagion effect would be if a bank failure is caused by problems whose revelation
is correlated across banks, and the correlated banks are impacted negatively.
1
                                                                
1 For a recent analysis see Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2002). For reviews of the
earlier literature, see Flannery (1998) and Kaufman (1994).4
Lang and Stulz (1992) provide the most comprehensive treatment of intra-industry
contagion effects in the extant literature. They investigate the effects of bankruptcy
announcements on the equity value of the bankrupt firm’s competitors. They find that the market
value of a value-weighted portfolio of the stocks of the competitors of the bankrupt firms
declines significantly at the time of the bankruptcy announcements. Lang and Stulz (1992) argue
that bankruptcy announcements need not convey only bad news for other firms in the industry.
By redistributing wealth from the bankrupt firm to its competitors, Lang and Stulz (1992)
suggest that a bankruptcy announcement may have a positive impact under certain
circumstances. They document empirically, that when industries are more concentrated and firms
are less levered, the average value of competitors’ equity increases significantly. This suggests
that in some industries, competitors benefit from the difficulties of the bankrupt firms.
Aharony and Swary (1983) pioneered the distinction between pure and signaling-based
contagious effects. And, Lang and Stulz (1992) significantly add to the literature by introducing
the importance of the competitive effects in contagion analysis. However, both of these
contributions focused on intra-industry impacts only. In this paper, we focus on both the intra-
industry and “inter-industry” effects of potential contagion producing announcements. Following
the intuition in Lang and Stulz (1992), we reason that firms which produce similar output and
use similar input, may be impacted by the same announcements, even if they are classified in
different industries (SIC codes). And, thus the inter-industry impacts of contagion may be as
costly and important as the intra-industry consequences.
We use three major announcements of financial distress in this study. The first
announcement is by a large commercial bank (the Bank of New England), the second
announcement consists of a series of events—from several large banking organizations and a5
regulatory agency (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), and the third announcement is
by a large life insurance company (Travelers).  We first establish that the commercial bank
announcements negatively impact the equity values of life insurance companies (and vice versa).
Next, we demonstrate that the bank regulatory agency announcement negatively impacts the
equity values of life insurance companies as well as commercial banks. We then explicitly test if
the shareholder wealth effects are linked to a set of specific firm characteristics.
Consistent with previous contagion studies, our results provide strong evidence of “intra-
industry” contagion related wealth effects.  We also find that these contagion effects, to a
significant degree, can be explained by firm specific variables.  This implies that the intra-
industry spillover effects associated with our three events are not of the totally “pure” contagion
variety, but have an informational component as well.
We also find very strong evidence of significant “inter-industry” contagion-based
shareholder wealth effects. Again, these contagion-based wealth effects do not appear to be
purely contagion-based. Wealth effects can also be explained by such factors as: geographic
proximity, asset composition, liability composition, leverage, size, and regulatory expectations.
Thus, it appears that the market considers both expected changes in the revenue produced
by assets as well as the expected changes in costs due to competitive and regulatory influences
when determining the magnitude of shareholder wealth effects. This helps to explain why in
some instances competitors benefit from a rival firm’s financial distress announcement. Further,
this positive competitive benefit may outweigh any negative revaluation effects of the
announcement.  Lastly, our results implicitly suggest that the market’s regulatory expectations
for commercial banks were different from those for life insurance companies during the period of
our study.6
This paper adds to the market efficiency literature by explicitly investigating and
documenting the importance of inter-industry contagion effects. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. In section 2, we provide some background and motivation about why inter-
industry contagion is important, why we use commercial banks and life insurance companies in
our analysis, and why we selected the events that we study. In section 3, we present the
hypotheses we are testing. In section 4, we discuss some aspects of the commercial real estate
market that are useful for interpreting our main results. In section 5, we provide a chronology of
the three events analyzed in this paper.  In section 6, we present our data and methodology.  In
section 7, we present our main results and discuss their implications. In this section, unlike
previous contagion studies, we offer an attempt to evaluate the proportion of the contagion effect
that is informational relative to that proportion which is pure contagion. Lastly, in section 8, we
offer a brief summary and some concluding remarks.
2. Background and motivation
The purpose of this paper is to explore the likely magnitude of inter-industry contagion.
Three specific questions underpin the motivation for pursuing this research. First, why
investigate inter-industry contagion? Second, why use commercial banks and life insurance
companies (LICs) in our investigation? And, third, why use the announcements (or events) that
we have chosen in this investigation.
Why investigate inter-industry contagion?
Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that if intra-industry contagion is not simply an
informational effect it will impose a social cost on our economic system. If this is true for intra-
industry contagion, then the same argument must hold for inter-industry contagion as well. At a7
more fundamental level, there may also be an industry definition problem. That is, the standard
industry classification codes (SICs) used in most empirical research may not adequately capture
the underlying economics of industry operations. For example, it may be difficult to classify
firms that face similar factor input markets, but different output markets. Additionally, Fenn and
Cole (1994) report evidence that the equity market considered the likely response of LIC
policyholders (factor inputs) in valuing the impact on individual LIC equity of Travelers’
financial distress announcement. If the market is smart enough to discern the likely reaction of
factor input suppliers; then market efficiency, as discussed in Fama (1998), would demand that
the market also be smart enough to look across SIC codes to consider the true economic markets
in which firms compete. That is, economic markets are more important than SIC codes [see
Stigler and Sherwin (1985) and Jackson (1992)]. Thus, inter-industry contagion is also worth
investigating.
Why banks and LICs?
With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, the financial services
landscape became less disjoint and more integrated. It is now possible for life insurance
companies and commercial banking organizations to become fully affiliated through a new
structure called a financial holding company. However, long before this official affiliation was
possible, banking organizations and LICs had begun to compete in similar input factor markets
as well as product markets. For example, both LICs and banking organizations have been major
players in the commercial real estate mortgage market for several decades (see Tables 1 and 2).
And, it has been recognized that banking organizations and LICs share certain similar
intermediary functions (Fama 1980). However, there also are differences between the two
organizations. As James (1987) points out, there appears to be something special about banking8
organizations. This specialty may be a result of the amount of private information banking
organizations produce relative to LICs as characterized in models such as Boyd and Prescott
(1986), Diamond (1984, 1991), Bhattaharya and Thakor (1993), and Kamakrishnan and Thakor
(1984). Or, it may stem from the different public policy and regulatory considerations to which
banking organizations are privy as mentioned in Diamond and Dybvig (1983, 1986), Fama
(1980, 1985), and Boot and Thakor (1991, 1993). One specific characteristic that large banking
organizations were thought by many to possess at the time of this study was the benefits of the
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) doctrine, as described in Kaufman (1994). TBTF suggested that if a
banking organization was large (and important) enough, regulators would not close the firm and
simply pay insured depositors if the banking organization went bankrupt. Rather, if a banking
organization was TBTF and went bankrupt, regulators would seek to keep the banking
organization’s operations intact perhaps by merging the insolvent TBTF banking organization
with another TBTF banking organization. Of course, this action would likely provide some
protection even for uninsured depositors and shareholders. Thus, it is not simply deposit
insurance that separates banking firms from LICs (as LICs have a form of liability guarantee
also).  Rather, it is a more general and subtle difference between investors’ expectations of the
implicit regulatory treatment of banking firms and LICs that may cause their market equity to
respond differently to similar financial crises. Because of their many similarities and significant
differences, LICs and banking firms provide an excellent laboratory to test our inter-industry
experiment.
Why these events?
Recall that we conduct our investigation by examining three separate announcements
involving adverse information about commercial real estate portfolios.  One of these9
announcements is from a large commercial bank (the Bank of New England), one is a series of
announcements by banking organizations and a regulatory agency (the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency), and one is from a large life insurance company (Travelers).
There are two reasons we chose these particular events.  First, the events seemed to be
very unusual and very significant indicators of future (and present) financial distress. Second, the
events shared a common theme of financial distress caused by problems with commercial real
estate portfolios.
3. The major hypotheses
Our earlier discussion suggests that announcements of commercial real estate problems,
asset write-downs and dividend cuts, and regulatory concerns about the condition of the
commercial real estate market could produce negative equity price reactions from the shares of
institutions dealing in commercial real estate. Like much of the extant literature, we test the
following four hypotheses about the impact of these announcements on share prices of
institutions dealing in commercial real estate: a.) the irrelevance hypothesis, b.) the positive
revaluation hypothesis, c.) the negative revaluation hypothesis, and, d.) the pure or
noninformational contagion hypothesis. Unlike the extant literature, we evaluate the inter-
industry as well as the intra-industry effects of these announcements.
3.1  The irrelevance hypothesis
Under the irrelevance hypothesis, commercial real estate financial distress
announcements have no significant impact on the share prices of non-announcement firms.   This
may occur because; 1) the announcements revealed new information for the values of non-10
announcement firms, but shareholders did not, or could not, fully incorporate the information
into share prices in a timely manner due to market inefficiency, 2) the financial distress
announcements were fully anticipated by market participants and provided no new information,
or 3) the causes of the financial distress and the regulators’ response to the firms’ weakening
condition were perceived to be idiosyncratic and not relevant to the non-announcement firms.
3.2  The positive revaluation hypothesis
Under the positive revaluation hypothesis, investors perceive the commercial real estate
financial distress announcements as relatively positive news for both the banking and insurance
companies that do not announce financial distress, generating positive abnormal returns for these
non-announcement firms.  This would occur if the financial distress announcements were
perceived as improving the competitive conditions for the non-announcement firms, increasing
their earnings and share prices (Lang and Stulz, 1992; and Kaufman, 1994).
3.3  The negative revaluation hypothesis
Under the negative revaluation hypothesis, the commercial real estate financial distress
announcements have a significant negative impact on the share prices of non-announcement
firms by signaling higher operating and regulatory costs.  The financial distress announcements
could have revealed previously undisclosed or understated problems in the commercial real
estate market.  In addition, firms that were perceived to be similar to the announcing firms could
face increased surveillance and various regulatory actions to restrict their activities
(Grammatikos and Saunders, 1990).11
3.4  The pure or noninformational contagion hypothesis
Under the pure contagion or noninformational contagion hypothesis, investors perceive
the announcements to affect all non-announcement firms stocks similarly, regardless of
differences in the financial condition or other characteristics of the individual firms. The ability
of the market to differentiate among firms is affected by the quality and timeliness of the
information that is publicly disclosed about these institutions.  The less accurate, precise, or
timely the information, the less likely are security prices to fully reflect the actual financial and
risk characteristics of the individual firms. In such environments, even if the financial distress
announcements revealed new information and had a significant impact on the banking and
insurance sectors, their impact on individual firm share prices will not be correlated with the
reported condition of the organizations.
In contrast, if accurate and timely information were available, investors could assess the
relevance of the financial distress announcements to the operation of individual firms. The
responses of shareholders would then be related to financial and other characteristics of the non-
announcement firms and be inconsistent with the noninformational hypothesis.  For example, if
the financial distress announcements revealed previously undisclosed problems in the
commercial real estate sector of the economy, one would expect firms in weaker financial
condition or with greater exposures to the problem institutions to be more adversely affected.
4.  The commercial real estate market
About two-thirds of the commercial real estate market (which provides a market for loans
on nonresidential properties such as office buildings and manufacturing plants) traditionally has
been financed by commercial banking organizations and LICs.  For example, Table 1 shows that12
commercial banking organizations and LICs accounted for about 73 percent of all commercial
real estate loans in 1990.  During the 1980s, the commercial mortgage holdings of commercial
banking organizations grew at a faster rate than those of LICs.  While commercial banking
organizations are the larger holders of these loans, these loans make up a larger proportion of
LICs’ total assets (see Table 2).
Lending in the commercial real estate market requires substantial amounts of information
gathering in the form of credit evaluation and monitoring of borrowers' management through
covenant enforcement.  Borrowers in this market are typically small firms that do not have
access to alternative sources of funds.
A study of the commercial real estate market has indicated that the loans made in these
markets generally have less uniform terms than do other investments such as publicly traded
corporate bonds (Cabanilla, 1992). As a result, mortgage loans are less liquid.  Yields are higher
to reflect information gathering costs and greater default risk.  Because of these characteristics,
the commercial real estate market is an intermediated market similar to that for business loans.
Commercial banking organizations real estate problems could convey bad news about
LICs since the values of their real estate investments may be correlated.  All else equal, one
would expect that announcements of commercial real estate problems would have intra- and
inter-industry impact on firm share prices.  That is, announcements by banking organizations of
commercial real estate problems should affect the stock market valuation of other banking
organizations and LICs.  Similarly, announcements by LICs should affect the stock market of
other LICs and banking organizations.13
Table 3 provides information about the ex post rate of return from holding commercial
properties and vacancy rates of commercial and industrial structures.
2  A group of institutional
investors is surveyed by the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF)
on the rates of return they earn from their properties.  This survey was started in 1977 and has
increased over time in scope and the number of reporting investors.  The properties, which
include offices, warehouses, hotels, retail establishments, and apartments, are located in a variety
of regions in the United States.
3
Information on the overall Russell-NCREIF property index (total) and its two
components is provided in the table.  The income rate of return component is computed by taking
net operating income and dividing by the market value of the properties.  The capital rate of
return component measures the percentage change in the market values of the properties.  Since
1980, the trend in all three return series has been downward.  The capital rate of return was
negative in 1990.  As the rates of return series indicate, conditions in the commercial real estate
market had been deteriorating for some time before the announcements of commercial real estate
related problems by financial intermediaries in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Table 3 also shows the national vacancy rates for commercial and industrial properties.
4
Each vacancy rate pertains to the first quarter of the year.  The results in the table show that both
vacancy rate series were trending upward over the 1980-1990 period. This rise was remarkably
                                                                
2 See Hester (1992) for a discussion of the role of financial institutions in real estate markets.
3 Hester (1992) provides an excellent discussion of features of the Russell-NCREIF property
index.
4 Coldwell Banker Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc. publishes quarterly vacancy rate
information for both office buildings and industrial structures.  The commercial vacancy index is
computed for office buildings in downtown areas. Coldwell Banker’s industrial index is based on
results from a survey of industrial properties that could accommodate a tenant requiring at least
100,000 square feet.  See Hester (1992) for additional discussion of the features of these vacancy
rate series.14
steady over those 11 years, suggesting that commercial real estate markets could be overbuilt
which would adversely affect net operating income and property values.
5. Chronology of events relating to commercial real estate problems
Clearly the information in Table 3 indicates that the deteriorating conditions in the
commercial real estate market should not have caught market participants by surprise.  On the
other hand, market participants may have had difficulty assessing mortgage loan values in a
declining real estate market in which there are very few transactions.  Consequently,
announcements of commercial real estate related problems may convey new and unfavorable
information about the quality of real estate investors’ assets, causing real estate investors’ share
prices to decline.  This asset-information hypothesis pertains to the information content of
commercial real estate related announcements.
5.1  Event 1: Bank of New England Corporation boosts reserve for loan losses, December 15-
18, 1989
On December 15, 1989 the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Bank of New
England Corporation (BNEC) was expected to disclose that day the magnitude of a major fourth-
quarter loss, because of the northeast region’s real estate slump. The same story noted that
rumors had been circulating over the past month that federal bank examiners were taking a hard
look at the Bank of New England’s books, increasing speculation that there would be a major
increase in nonperforming loans. The WSJ reported on December 18 that rumors about BNEC
led the New York Stock Exchange to delay the opening bell for two hours for trading in the
stock.  BNEC announced on December 15 that its nonperforming loans would increase by $700
million by year-end.  This surge in problem real estate loans at BNEC after a third quarter
increase at Bank of Boston Corporation raised concerns about the outlook for New England’s15
real estate market.  The WSJ story indicated that the projected 78 percent fourth quarter jump in
Bank of New England’s nonperforming loans to $1.6 billion from $900 million at the end of the
third quarter was far worse than had been expected.  In addition, the WSJ story indicated that
analysts were concerned about whether all of BNEC’s real estate problems had been identified,
leading to speculation that more losses would be announced in the future.
5.2  Event 2: Announcements by the Comptroller of the Currency and several East Coast
banks, September 20-26, 1990.
On September 20, 1990, the Comptroller of the Currency Robert L. Clarke warned that
real estate conditions were likely to worsen, especially on the East Coast (see Trigaux, 1990). On
September 21, Chase Manhattan Corporation announced that it would cut its dividend in half and
increase its loan loss reserves by $650 million. On the same day, Midlantic Corporation and
Southeast Banking Corporation announced that they were increasing nonperforming loans in the
third quarter of 1990 and reducing or eliminating their dividend (see Goodwin, 1990; and
Horowitz and Leander, 1990). On September 27 Bank of Boston Corporation announced that it
was reducing its dividend because of worse than expected losses in its commercial real estate
loan portfolio.
5.3  Event 3: Travelers Corporation announces that it was reserving $650 million for
anticipated losses in its commercial real estate portfolio, October 5-8, 1990
On Friday October 5, Travelers Corporation, the seventh largest life insurance firm, with
more than $57 billion in assets, announced that it was reserving $650 million for anticipated
losses in its commercial real estate portfolio.  According to WSJ reports on Monday, October 8,
this announcement surprised investors.  Travelers expected to report a $500 million third quarter
loss as a result of the increase in loan loss reserves.  The company also announced a 33 percent16
cut in its common stock dividends from $0.60 per share to $0.40 per share.   At the close of the
New York Stock Exchange on Friday, Travelers stock price ended at a 52-week low of $16.375,
down $4.375 from the previous day’s closing price.  Some analysts had expected an addition to
reserves because of Travelers’ huge real estate exposure.  Travelers’ mortgage and real estate
portfolio amounted to $17.4 billion, 30 percent of its total $57.3 billion in assets (see WJS,
October 8).  At the end of the second quarter of 1990, $3.5 billion of the portfolio was classified
as underperforming loans.
On Monday, October 8, Travelers made additional substantive disclosures during a
meeting with security analysts in New York.  Travelers’ executives said the company might sell
more assets, cut some operations, and even sell some stocks and bonds in its investment
portfolio, but analysts and major investors said these moves still might not be enough. On
Monday, Travelers’ stock slid $2.00 more to close at $14.375.  Travelers’ problems spilled over
to most other insurance stocks, much like the effect of Chase Manhattan Corporation’s problems
on other banks following its announcement on September 21.  However, insurers’ real estate
portfolios were viewed as a little less risky than those of banks, because insurers generally lend
to completed projects such as office buildings where space is already leased, while banks lend
much earlier on in the process of real estate development.  Nevertheless, analysts expected
Travelers’ actions to presage similar moves by other insurance companies with substantial real
estate holdings, and might lead them to re-evaluate their dividend policy.  Most analysts believed
that Travelers would have to cut its payout again if the real estate market did not recover.
During the meeting on October 8, Travelers’ executives told analysts that the company’s $3.5
billion in non-performing mortgage loans could increase by 10 percent to 15 percent within the
next year.17
Fenn and Cole (1994) argued that Travelers Corporation’s announcement was significant
to shareholders of other insurance companies, not for what it revealed about the state of the
commercial real estate market, but because of the anticipated impact of the announcement on the
behavior of policyholders, especially guaranteed investment contracts holders.
Guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) are widely used as funding instruments for
defined contribution pension plans, typically obligate a life company to repay principal and
interest accruing at a predetermined rate in a single payment at maturity.  Thus, GICs provide a
close substitute for bank certificates of deposit (see Todd and Wallace, 1992).
5
Fenn and Cole (1994) pointed out that the Travelers Corporation’s announcement
concerning investment losses could have a negative impact on other LICs' profitability by
inducing policyholders to exercise their withdrawal options and discouraging new policy sales.
LICs' increased reliance on annuity contracts and GICs has at least three implications for the
financial condition of life insurance companies.  First, policyholders appear to shop around for
high rates of return, forcing profit margins down.  Second, policyholders appear to be more
sensitive to LICs' capital.  Third, holders of annuity contracts and GICs are more willing to
exercise their withdrawal options, causing liquidity problems for companies with poor asset
quality.  If shareholders anticipate these reactions from policyholders, it should be reflected in
stock market prices.  LICs shareholders' returns should be below those that they would normally
receive for companies that held large concentrations of risky assets, and whose products offered
significant withdrawal options, or whose products were potentially rating sensitive.
                                                                
5 Todd and Wallace (1992) argue that GICs were used by many LICs in the 1980s to facilitate
rapid growth.  Since these liabilities, along with single premium deferred annuities (SPDAs),
have payoff characteristics similar to bank certificates of deposit, Todd and Wallace argue that
LICs could use SPDAs and GICs to draw on savings previously held in other forms without the
constraint imposed by the growth in the demand for insurance.18
6.  Data and Methodology
We examine share price responses to these three announcements for 134 banking
organizations and 61 life insurance companies.  Banking organizations are segregated into big
banks (money center and super-regional banking organizations), Northeast (excluding banking
organizations in the big bank group), and other firms.  Northeastern banking organizations have
headquarters and substantial operations in the following states: Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania.
Stock returns of life insurance companies are also examined to determine whether the
comptroller’s statement in September 1990 and banks’ announcements revealed unfavorable
information about the quality of insurance company assets.
Daily share prices for banking organizations and life insurance companies are obtained
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) file.  The stock market index employed
in this study is the value-weighted portfolio (NYSE and AMEX) obtained from the CRSP
database.
6.1 Event study procedure
We test the previously described research hypotheses by applying a standard event-study
methodology similar to that described in detail in Dodd and Warner (1983).  For each security i,
under the assumption of multivariate normality, the market model is used to calculate abnormal
return (ARi,t) for event day t as:
, ˆ ˆ , , , t m i i t i t i R R AR b a - - = (1)
where
Ri,t = return to firm i on day t,19
i a ˆ ,  i b ˆ = market model parameter estimates, and
Rm,t = return to the value-weighted CRSP market portfolio on day t.
The market model parameter estimates for each firm are obtained using a maximum of
240 trading days of daily returns data beginning 260 days before the first event.












Following Patell’s (1976), we employ the Z-statistic to determine whether the abnormal
returns are statistically significant. First, we compute the standardized abnormal return to the ith


























si,t = standard deviation of the residuals in the market model estimation period,
Ti  = number of days in the estimation period, and
m R = mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period.

















Finally, the Z-statistic for firm i is computed as:20
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and for a portfolio of NP firms is computed as:
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We examine the individual firms’ abnormal returns -- ARi,t -- for each event.  If the
impact of the financial distress announcements were consistent with the positive revaluation
hypothesis and had unanticipated positive implications for the banking and insurance industries
by reducing competition, we would expect the abnormal returns during the event window to be
positive and statistically significant.  If the impact of the events were consistent with the negative
revaluation hypothesis and revealed previously unanticipated adverse news for the banking and
insurance industries by indicating greater weakness or risk of more timely regulatory closure, we
would expect the individual firm reactions to be significantly negative.  If the impact of the
events were consistent with the irrelevance hypothesis and revealed no new information or were
considered irrelevant by the shareholders of non-announcing firms, the abnormal returns would
be statistically indistinguishable from zero. To distinguish among the positive revaluation, the
negative revaluation, and the irrelevance hypotheses, we test the hypothesis 
1
0 H , that the
abnormal returns for the portfolios non-announcing institutions equal to zero for each event e:
,
1
, 0 0 . :0   pe pe HARorCAR = =
In addition, we report the number of negative abnormal returns among the non-announcing
institutions, the number of firms in the portfolio, and the Z-statistic testing the hypothesis that
50% of the abnormal returns are positive. A rejection of this hypothesis would be consistent with
the negative revaluation hypothesis.21
6.2 Firms operating characteristics
We also test the pure or noninformational contagion hypothesis to explore whether there
is evidence of cross-sectional variation in the responses of banking organizations and LICs based
on their own financial condition. Specifically, we examine whether the variations in firms’
cumulative abnormal returns are related to that firm’s commercial real estate exposure,
capitalization, funding sources, geographic location, and market conditions.
6.3 Life insurance companies
For each of the three events, the announcement effect on life insurance companies’
cumulative abnormal returns is examined by cross-sectionally estimating the following
regression equation:
, , , 1 0 i
k
k i k i COND CAR e g g + + = ￿ (7)
where  k i COND , is a variable that describes the kth financial condition of firm i at the time of the
event and ei is an error term with assumed standard properties.  In consideration of Fenn and
Cole (1994), the financial condition variables (COND) that we use are: 1) the ratio of
commercial real estate loans to total assets (CRE); 2) the ratio of book value of equity to total
assets (CAP); 3) the ratio of guaranteed investment contracts to total assets (GIC); and 4) the
cumulative abnormal return over the 22 trading days ending one day before each event
(SURPRISE).
The relationship between commercial real estate exposure and cumulative abnormal
returns should be negative, with large-exposure life insurance companies showing more return
sensitivity than small-exposure banking organizations. Fenn and Cole (1994) found that the runs22
at Travelers Corporation pushed down share prices at other LICs.  They also found that, among
LICs holding relatively high amounts of commercial real estate loans, the negative impact of the
announced asset quality problems was worse for companies with larger GICs and annuities and
smaller capital. To investigate these possibilities, we test the hypothesis
2
0, : 0, ik H g =
for each of the three events and each of the financial condition variables.
Each of the 61 insurance companies specialized in life insurance (greater than 60% of
their assets). Balance sheet variables for the LICs are from the Statutory Reports of Condition
that insurance companies are required to file with state regulators at the end of each year.  For
multiple LIC holding companies, we aggregate (sum) the assets and liabilities of individual
subsidiaries.
6.4 Banking organizations
In previous intra-industry contagion studies Aharony and Swary (1996) found that
geographic distance and capital were negatively related to the contagion effect, but bank size was
positively related. Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997) found that money-center and large
regional banks reacted differently than other banks.  Akhigbe and Madura (2001) reported that
the informational element of the contagion effect varies over time, bank size, capital levels.
We considered the findings of these previous studies when determining the variables to
use in estimating equation (7) for our banking organizations.  Consistent with these previous
studies, we use the following financial and market condition variables to describe our banking
organizations at each event date.  First, NONRESIDENTIAL is the ratio of nonresidential real
estate loans to total assets.  Second, CONSTRUCT is the ratio of construction loans to total
assets.  Third, CAPITAL is the ratio of book value of equity to total assets.  Fourth,23
NORTHEAST is an indicator variable for northeastern banking organizations. Fifth, BIG BANK
is an indicator variable for money center or super-regional banks.  And, sixth, SURPRISE is the
cumulative abnormal return over the 22 trading days ending one day before each event.  To
prevent possible estimation problems caused by the correlation of our NORTHEAST and BIG
BANK variables, banks in the BIG BANK category are excluded from the NORTHEAST
category even if they are located in the northeast region.
Estimation of equation (7) allows us to test whether the market’s ability to distinguish
among banking organizations varies by the degree of commercial real estate exposure, as well as
other financial and market conditions.  For example, the negative or positive signal resulting
from commercial real estate related announcements should cause a greater revaluation of those
banking organizations in the northeastern area that were more susceptible to the same type of
problems.  Because of proximity, those banking organizations may have had a greater exposure
to problem commercial real estate. We obtain balance sheet data for individual banking
organizations from the Federal Reserve Y-9 data files.
7. Empirical results
After the groundbreaking study of Aharony and Swary (1983), most studies of intra-
industry contagion followed a two step evaluation process.  In the first step the researchers
sought to establish that a contagious event had occurred.  And, in the second step, the researchers
tested whether the contagious event (given a positive finding in step one) was of a pure
contagion nature or if it exhibited evidence of an informational component.  For example, this is
the basic procedure used in Lang and Stulz (1992), Fenn and Cole (1994), Aharony and Swary24
(1996), Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1999), Bessler and Nohel (2000), Akhigbe and Madura
(2001).
For the first step in this research procedure, a market model was usually used to establish
if the market responded to the event.  The event was usually defined around an announcement
(often of a negative orientation) reported in a well-regarded business newspaper (e.g., The Wall
Street Journal).  If the abnormal returns of the announcing firm (or firms) were significant and/or
the abnormal returns of a portfolio of firms in the same industry were significant, the researchers
usually concluded that a contagious event had occurred.  For step two, the researchers typically
used the individual abnormal returns for the firms in the industry portfolio, that is, the non-
announcing firms, to test whether the event had any informational contagion elements to it. This
was done by testing for any significant cross sectional correlation between the abnormal returns
of the individual firms, and specific characteristics of those firms that should be related to the
information released by the event.  For example, an event releasing new information to the
market about commercial real estate should have a relatively larger impact on firms with
relatively more commercial real estate in their portfolios (all else equal).
This same type of two-step process is followed in this study.  However, we attempt to go
beyond the extant literature by using our individual firm abnormal returns in several novel ways.
The rest of this section proceeds as follows.  In subsections 7.1 and 7.2, we establish that both
intra- and inter- industry contagious type events occurred. In subsection 7.3, we present the cross
sectional regression results for life insurance companies (LICs) for the three events.  The
responses of the LICs to the two bank-related events appear to have less of an informational
component relative to the LICs response to the LIC related event.  In subsection 7.4, we present
the corresponding cross-sectional results for banking organizations and show that the cumulative25
abnormal returns (CARs) for our individual banks exhibit an informational component in
response to the two bank-related events.  We also show that the cross sectional CARs for our
banks exhibit an informational component in response to the life insurance event.  These findings
suggest that both the intra- and inter-industry contagion effects that we document in this study
have an informational component within.  We discuss in much more detail the issues of relative
informational components across intra- and inter-industry events in subsection 7.5.
7.1 Performance of distressed financial institutions to own announcement and that by other
firms
Panel A of Table 4 provides estimates of abnormal returns for Travelers Corporation and
five major BHCs making announcements of problems in their commercial real estate portfolios
over our sample period.  The five BHCs are, BNEC, Bank of Boston Corporation, Chase
Manhattan, Midlantic Corporation, and Southeast Banking Corporation.  On December 15, 1989,
BNEC disclosed that it was raising its loan loss reserves (event 1), and this disclosure led to a
negative and statistically significant stock market reaction.  The cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) over a two-day event period (i.e., Friday, December 15 and Monday, December 18) was a
negative 42.65% for BNEC.  The CARs are negative for all of the other four BHCs as well; but
only two are significant (-11.48% and -8.97% for Bank of Boston Corporation and Southeast
Banking Corporation, respectively).  Notice that Travelers Corporation (an insurance company)
had a negative and significant CAR (-3.60%), suggesting that this announcement by BNEC (a
banking organization) had a significant inter-industry effect also.
Notice that event 2 (a banking event) also provides evidence of an inter-industry effect as
it produced a negative and statistically significant impact on the shares of Travelers Corporation
(as well as the five BHCs).  From Table 4, observe that Chase Manhattan’s CAR was -14.86%26
over the 6-day event period (September 20-27) that included its announcement of a 50% cut in
dividend and increase in loan loss reserves by $650 million. The CARs for the other banking
organizations announcing dividend reductions and suspensions during the event 2 period was
-12.66% for Bank of Boston Corporation, -17.12% for Midlantic Corporation, and -9.12% for
Southeast Banking Corporation.
The Comptroller of the Currency announcement during event 2, might have raised
concerns that a large number of banks would be forced to make additions to their loan loss
reserves in the future to cover commercial real estate loans.  Future additions would be expected
to lower banks’ future capital ratios and raise regulatory costs in the form of increased
surveillance by regulators and/or the costs of raising additional equity capital to comply with
regulatory imposed minimum capital standards (see Grammatikos and Saunders, 1990).  The
loan loss reserve announcements by Chase Manhattan, Midlantic Corporation, and Southeast
Banking Corporation served to reinforce the Comptroller’s statement concerning commercial
problems at northeastern banks.  Moreover, these announcements highlighted the deteriorating
condition of the commercial real estate market in generally, sending a negative information
signal to outside investors about the valuation of institutions exposed to commercial real estate
problems.  As at the BNEC’s announcement, at the Comptroller of the Currency and East Coast
BHC’s announcements, Travelers Corporation’s CARs are negative and statistically significant.
Again, this suggests an inter-industry contagion effect of banking organizations related financial
distress announcements on this life insurance company.
The announcement (event 3) by Travelers of an increase in loan loss reserves and
decrease in dividends per share was associated with a significant CAR of -33.41% for the
Travelers Corporation.  More interestingly, the CARs were positive for four of the five BHCs, of27
which, three were significant. Like the bank announcements, the Travelers’ announcement had a
substantial inter-industry impact.  However, unlike the financial distress announcements
associated with banking organizations, the Travelers’ announcement had a positive inter-industry
impact.  Taking together, these results suggest that asset write-downs (and dividend reductions
and suspensions) can have both positive and negative inter-industry impacts.
7.2  Abnormal returns of non-announcing banks and life insurance companies
Panel A of Table 4 also provides estimates of the abnormal returns for portfolios of non-
announcing banking organizations and life insurance companies over our three events.  In the
column labeled “Other Banks,” we report the results for non-announcing banks and in the
column labeled “Other Life Insurance Companies” we present the results for non-announcing life
insurance companies.  The Z-statistic is reported beneath the abnormal returns.  In each column,
the row beneath the Z-statistics reports the number of negative abnormal returns, the number of
firms in the sample, and the Z-statistic testing the hypothesis that 50% of the abnormal returns
are positive. For non-announcing banks, the CARs are negative and statistically significant for
the first two events. As a portfolio, non-announcing banks did not exhibit a significant change in
shareholder value at the announcement of Travelers Corporation’s loan loss reserves addition
and dividend reduction.  The two-day CAR for the portfolio of non-announcing banking
organizations of 0.15% has a corresponding Z-statistic of 0.34.
To determine whether non-announcing banks with negative abnormal returns statistically
outnumbered those with positive returns, we computed the proportion of positive abnormal
returns minus 0.5 divided by the standard deviation of a binomial distribution (the “sign test”).
The sign test indicates that the number of banks with negative abnormal returns exceeded those28
with positive returns in all three cases, although statistically significant so in only the first two
events.  The results for non-announcing BHCs’ reactions to the bank-related announcements are
consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis.  However, the result for the Travelers
Corporation’s announcement is not consistent with the negative revaluation hypothesis.
Unlike non-announcing banking organizations, the CARs for non-announcing LICs are
all negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the sign test for the other LICs indicates more
negative CARs in all three events, supporting the negative revaluation hypothesis.  Thus, bank-
and life insurance-related announcements have a statistically significant effect on the portfolio of
other LICs overall, suggesting that there are substantial inter- and intra-industry effects of the
three events analyzed in this paper.
Next, we investigate whether the average response of non-announcing banking
organizations was equal to the average response of non-announcing life insurance companies for
each event.  These results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.  The results indicate that the
portfolio of non-announcing banks was more adversely affected by the bank-related
announcements than was the portfolio of non-announcing LICs.  However, the portfolio of non-
announcing LICs was more adversely affected by Travelers Corporation’s announcement.
Although there are substantial inter-industry effects at each event, these financial distress
announcements appear to have a greater impact on firms in the same industry as the announcing
institutions.
7.3 Cross-section tests of LICs commercial real estate exposure
Obviously, our announcements need not have equal effects on all non-announcing
organizations within the same industry.  Indeed, Fama (1991, 1998) argues that in a semi-29
efficiency market, if information is publicly available about the characteristics of the firms
involved, then those firms with characteristics more similar to those of the announcing firm(s)
should respond differently than those with less similar exposures.  And, from table 5 we observe
that there is a wide range for the exposure characteristics associated with our sample of non-
announcing bank holding companies and life insurance companies.  In order to examine this
issue, we estimate equation (7) for both banking organizations and LICs.
Table 6 presents the cross sectional CAR results for LICs.  The LICs with relatively more
commercial mortgages experienced significantly more negative CARs at Travelers Corporation’s
announcement.  At BNEC’s announcement (event 1) this effect is not statistically significant.
Nor, is it significant at the Comptroller of the Currency and East Coast banking organizations’
announcements (event 2).  Unlike the specification for the Travelers Corporation’s
announcement (event 3), these specifications have low adjusted-R
2, suggesting that the correlates
explain a small amount of the variability in CARs.
For our non-announcing LIC sample, commercial real estate exposure has very little
impact on how shareholders react to our two bank-related announcements, but has a significant
negative effect for our LIC related announcement.  A possible explanation for this is that the
bank events provide little new information about LICs because public information about the
market value of LIC assets is substantial, and better than public information about bank assets.
The results for the GIC variable suggests that the market expected the cost of GIC funding to
rise, decreasing the market value of LICs that heavily depend on GIC funding (Fenn and Cole,
1994).  For every case presented in Table 6, the coefficient on the GIC variable is negative, and
it is statistically significantly for both events 1 and 3.30
7.4 Cross-section tests of BHCs commercial real estate exposure
Previous research on intra-industry contagion (e.g., Aharony and Swary, 1996) suggests
that geographic proximity, bank size, and capitalization may help explain the variation in
contagion effects across firms.  Our binary variables (NORTHEAST and BIG BANK) allow us
to differentiate along geographic and size dimensions the impact of each of the events on BHC
share prices.  And, we include a capital ratio variable (CAPITAL) also.
The relationship between the capitalization ratio and CARs should be positive, with well-
capitalized BHCs showing less return sensitivity than poorly capitalized ones. On the other hand,
the relationship between commercial real estate exposure (nonresidential real estate and
construction loans) and CARs should be negative, with large-exposure BHCs showing more
return sensitivity than small-exposure BHCs.
Results of the cross-sectional estimation of equation (7) for BHCs for the three events are
presented in Table 7.  Our results indicate a significant relationship between the capitalization
ratio (CAPITAL) and the cross sectional CARs for each of the first two events.  In general, for
our sample of non-announcing BHCs, those less well capitalized had more negative CARs.  Note
that the coefficients on the CONSTRUCT variable are negative and statistically significant for
all three events.  Thus, non-announcing BHCs with greater loan exposures to the riskier
construction sector were significantly more adversely affected by all three announcements. At
BNEC’s announcement (event 1), the market penalty was greater for northeast BHCs, while it
was relatively less for BIG BANK institutions.  BIG BANK institutions were also less adversely
affected by the announcement of Travelers Corporation’s addition to its loan loss reserves and
dividend reduction (event 3).31
7.4.1  When do competitive effects dominate contagion effects?
We observe from tables 6 and 7 that our independent variables do a reasonable job of
explaining cross-sectional variation in the distribution of CARs for most events.  However, it
would be impossible from tables 6 and 7 to investigate whether the average CARs for a select
portfolio of non-announcing firms was positive (or negative) for a specific event.  Such analysis
is important because it would allow us to investigate when the competitive effects of our
financial distress announcements dominate the contagion effects.
Lang and Stulz (1992) were the first to demonstrate that the positive revaluation effect
(what they defined as their competitive effect) might dominate the negative revaluation effect
(what they defined as their contagion effect) for a certain group of firms.  Recall that the positive
revaluation effect stems from the financial distress announcements being perceived as improving
the competitive conditions for the non-announcement firms.  And, the negative revaluation effect
is associated with the perception that firms similar to the announcing firms may face increased
operational and regulatory costs.
To investigate this issue, we grouped our non-announcing firms into portfolios based on
high (above the median) or low for continuous variables and yes or no for the binary variables.
We did this for each explanatory variable for each event listed in table 6 or 7.  We also
investigated portfolios based on various combinations of our explanatory variables.
We searched for pairs of portfolios where the response of one portfolio had a different
sign than the response of the other portfolio.  Portfolios were matched by explanatory variable.
We found only one instance of a portfolio that exhibited signs of the competitive effect
dominating the contagion effect.32
A summary of our results for this analysis is presented in table 8.  Notice that for event 3
the response for the portfolio of BIG banks is a significant and positive 1.83%, while the
response for the portfolio of NON-BIG banks is a significant and negative 0.31%.  This suggests
that the announcement by Travelers had a positive and significant impact on money-center and
super-regional banks.  Or, that for this group of banks, the positive revaluation associated with
the competitive effects dominated the negative revaluation associated with the contagion effects.
To understand why this is a reasonable result, notice the response by GIC and NON-GIC life
insurance companies to event 3.  The portfolio of LICs with GICs in their liability structure
exhibited a negative and significant 4.37% response to the Travelers’ announcement, but the
portfolio of LICs without GICs declined by only 1.90%.  This difference is statistically (and
economically) significant.
It appears the market expected LICs using GICs to face higher funding costs as their GIC
policyholders fled LICs and, benefiting those banking organizations with relatively more
purchased funds per dollar of assets. Purchased funds equal gross purchased funds (the sum of
time deposit of $100,000 or more, federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements
to repurchase in domestic offices, deposits in foreign offices and in Edge and Agreement
subsidiaries, commercial paper, and other borrowings with an original maturity under 1 year)
less federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell in domestic offices.
One year before the Travelers’ announcement the purchased funds ratio was 35.6% and 26.6%
for money center and super-regional banking organizations, respectively, while the ratio was
16.8% for other banking organizations.  Thus, those banking organizations with relatively more
confident-sensitive funding vehicles experienced positive ARs at Travelers’ announcement.33
This is one of the main results of our paper.  That is, we not only find evidence of inter-
industry contagion, and that this inter-industry contagion has a significant informational
component. But, we also find evidence that the positive revaluation effect sometimes dominates
the negative revaluation effect for inter-industry contagion.  Or, using the terminology of Lang
and Stulz (1992), the competitive effect dominates the contagion effect.
7.5 Discussion of Inter-Industry Results
Our results suggest that there is a significant inter-industry impact of the three financial
distress announcements, and that this impact is correlated with the financial characteristics of the
non-announcing firms. We would like to know whether, after controlling for the financial
characteristics of the non-announcing firms, the stock market reaction of life insurance
companies to each event is different from that of banking organizations. Table 4 results suggest
that the stock market reactions of  LICs are different from that of banking organizations.
However, these differences could be related to differences in financial characteristics as
suggested in tables 6 and 7. To address this issue, we pooled the time series observations for both
banking and insurance organizations to estimate the correlation between cumulative abnormal
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where the bank financial condition variables (CONDk,B) are the ratio of commercial real estate
loans to total assets (NONRES); the ratio of construction loans to total assets (CONSTRUCT);34
the ratio of book value of equity to total assets (CAPITAL); an indicator variable for money
center banking and super-regional banking organizations (BIG BANKS); and an indicator
variable for northeastern banking organizations other than BIG BANKS (NORTHEAST). Life
insurance financial condition variables (CONDi,L) are the ratio of commercial real estate loans to
total general account assets (CMORT); the ratio of book value of equity to total general account
assets (CAP); and the ratio of life insurance  issuance of guaranteed investment contracts to total
assets(GIC). SURPRISE is the cumulative abnormal return over the 22 trading days ending one
day before each event announcement.  BL1 is an indicator variable for life insurance companies
and bank event 1 - Bank of New England loan loss addition; BL2 is an indicator variable for life
insurance companies and bank event 2 - the Comptroller of the Currency warning; East Coast
banking organizations’ dividend reductions and suspensions; and LB is an indicator variable for
banks and event 3 – Travelers Corporation’s loan loss addition and dividend reduction. Our
regression equation also includes indicator variables for each event (Event1, Event2, and
Event3). We suppress the intercept term to avoid the “dummy variable trap.” By including an
intercept term and separate indicator variables for each event, we would have a problem of
perfect multicollinearity, whereby for each observation the sum of the event indicator variables is
equal to one and is perfectly correlated with the intercept term. To avoid this dummy variable
trap, researchers typically omit one of the indicator variables or the intercept term (Greene, 1997,
p. 230).  Here, we omit the intercept term.
Conditioned on the financial characteristics of banking organizations, the coefficients on
Event1 and Event2 measure the average response of banking organizations to events 1 and 2,
respectively, while conditioned on the financial characteristics of life insurance companies the
coefficient on Event3 measures the average response of life insurance companies to event 3. The35
coefficient on BL1, lB1, captures the stock market reaction to event 1 of life insurance companies
relative to banking organizations. The coefficient on BL2, lB2, captures the stock market reaction
to event 2 of life insurance companies relative to banking organizations. The coefficient on LB,
lL, captures the stock market reaction to event 3 of banking organizations relative to life
insurance companies.
The results of estimating equation (8) are reported in table 9.  The coefficient on BL1
(BANK EVENT1 - LIFE REACTION) is 0.0640 (t-statistic = 3.18), suggesting that, after
controlling for differences in financial characteristics, CARs of non-announcing LICs were less
negative relative to those of non-announcing banking organizations. However, the coefficient on
BL2 (BANK EVENT2 - LIFE REACTION) is insignificant.  Thus, there is little, if any,
differences in the stock market reactions of life insurance companies and banking organizations
at event 2 announcement dates. The coefficient on LB (LIFE EVENT - BANK REACTION) is
0.0420 (t-statistic = 2.15), suggesting that CARs of non-announcing banking organizations were
less negative relative to those of non-announcing LICs.  Overall, these results suggest that,
controlling for differences in financial characteristics, there remain differences in between
banking and life insurance organizations’ responses to two of the three financial distress
announcements.
7.5.1.  What proportion of the contagion effect is informational?
The differences, mentioned in the previous section, between the responses of LICs and
banking organizations to financial distress announcements may provided some insight into the
relative amount of informational content in the contagion effects examined in this study.  Most
modern contagion studies make a distinction between pure and informational-based contagion36
effects.  However, there are no modern contagion studies that systematically quantify contagious
responses into the percentage that is pure contagion versus the percentage that is informational
contagion.
If a model can explain all of the cross-sectional variations in the distribution of CARs of
firms responding to a contagious event, then that contagious effect could be considered totally
informational.  However, if a model can explain none of this cross-sectional variation, it does not
mean that the contagious effect can be considered totally pure contagion.  The latter may simply
mean that the model is a “bad” model.  This bad model problem makes it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to precisely quantify the informational (or pure) proportion of the contagion
effect.  This may explain, to some extent, why previous attempts to disentangle the component of
contagion effects are rare.
Our attempt at separating these two effects recognizes the impossibility of absolute
precision and thus focuses on providing some relative comparisons between LICs and banks for
our three events.  For this comparison, note that the (adjusted) R
2 in table 9 is 0.48.  This
suggests that our model does a relatively good job of explaining the cross-sectional variation in
the pooled CARs of our LICs and banking organizations.  (By comparison, very few of the
contagion studies in the literature report adjusted R-squares above 0.40.)  From table 9, we focus
on event1, event2, and event3.  These three dummy variables function as intercept terms for
banks’ response to a banking event (event1 and event2) and LICs’ response to a LIC event
(event3).  Given that the variables in our model have been scaled properly and that our set of
independent variables is reasonably robust, then we may consider the intercept terms as
indicators of “common trends” unexplained by our model.  And, these common trends may be37
loosely interpreted as pure contagion.  A significant coefficient for event1, event2, or event3
would suggest a significant common trend and a significant amount of pure contagion.
For example, notice that the coefficient on event1 is negative and significant at the one-
percent level.  This suggests that for the first banking event banks responded in a manner
consistent with some negative pure contagion component.  This is also the case with event2, the
second banking event.  However, the coefficient on event3 is not significantly different from
zero.  This suggests that there was no significant common trend in the response of LICs to the
LIC event.  When we compare the coefficients for event3 with event2 or event1, we develop the
following relative qualitative measure of pure contagion.  There is much more pure contagion
associated with the banks’ response to the banking events than that there is for the LICs response
to the LIC events.  This is consistent with the results from tables 6 and 7.
8. Conclusions
This paper adds to the market efficiency literature by explicitly investigating the potential
importance of inter-industry contagion and competitive effects.
Our results provide very strong evidence of significant inter-industry shareholder wealth
effects. However, these shareholder wealth effects do not appear to be purely contagious in
nature. The wealth effects are directly linked to such factors as: geographic proximity, asset
portfolio composition, leverage, and regulatory expectations. Thus, it appears that the market
considers both expected changes in the revenue produced by assets as well as the expected
changes in costs due to competitive and regulatory influences when determining the magnitude
of shareholder wealth effects. This helps to explain why in some instances competitors benefit
from a rival firm’s financial distress announcement. And, that this positive competitive benefit
may outweigh any negative revaluation effects of the announcement. We find evidence of a net38
positive revaluation effect for large banks responding to the Travelers announcement. We also
find evidence that there is less pure contagion associated with life insurance companies’ financial
distress announcements to similar bank holding companies’ announcements.References
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This table presents the relative importance of banks and life insurance companies in the commercial real estate
market.  Commercial mortgages include amounts for construction and permanent loans on commercial properties
(office buildings, industrial structures, resorts, etc.).  Percent of total commercial mortgage loans is in parentheses
beneath the dollar amount.  The data comes from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of






















































































Table 2. Percentage of total financial assets held as commercial mortgage loans
This table presents the relative importance of commercial mortgage holdings for banks and life insurance
companies as a percent of total financial assets for each group of firms.  The data comes from the Board of
















Table 3. Annual rates of return and vacancy rates on commercial properties, nationwide
This table provides data on the rate of return of holding commercial real estate and vacancy rates for
downtown commercial office buildings and industrial properties from 1980 to 1990. Rates of return on
commercial properties are from National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (Copyright 1992 by
NCREIF and Frank Russell Company, Tacoma, WA.  All rights reserved).  Data are for year-end March
31.  Vacancy rates are from CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc.  The values of the vacancy rates are
for March in each year.
                   NCREIF Property
                      Rate of Return Indices
                      Annual Rates of Returns
Coldwell Banker Vacancy
Rate Indices




1980 18.1 8.4  9.1 3.4 3.5
1981 16.6 8.1 8.1 3.8 3.8
1982  9.4 7.9 1.5 5.5 3.8
1983 13.1 7.9 4.9 10.8 4.8
1984 13.8 7.6 5.9 13.1 4.8
1985 11.2 7.5 3.5 15.4 4.8
1986 8.3 7.4 0.9 16.5 5.3
1987 8.0 7.3  0.7 16.3 5.9
1988 9.6 7.0 2.5 16.3 5.8
1989 7.7 6.6 1.1 16.1 6.0
1990 2.3 6.6 -4.1 16.7 6.546
Table 4.  Abnormal returns of banking organizations and life insurance companies
This table presents the abnormal returns for announcing firms, other banking organizations, and other life insurance companies surrounding the three events.  The
three events are: Event 1: Bank of New England (BNEC). BNEC announced on December 15 that its nonperforming loans would increase by $700 million by
year-end.  This surge in problem real estate loans at BNEC after a third quarter increase at Bank of Boston Corporation raised concerns about the outlook for
New England’s real estate market.  The WSJ story indicated that the projected 78 percent fourth quarter jump in Bank of New England’s nonperforming loans to
$1.6 billion from $900 million at the end of the third quarter was far worse than had been expected.  In addition, the WSJ story indicated that analysts were
concerned about whether all of BNEC’s real estate problems had been identified, leading to speculation that more losses would be announced in the future; Event
2: On September 20, 1990 the Comptroller of the Currency Robert L. Clarke warned that real estate conditions are likely to worsen, especially on the East Coast
(see American Banker, September 21). On September 21 Chase Manhattan Corporation announced that it would cut its dividend in half and increase its loan loss
reserves by $650 million. On the same day, Midlantic Corporation and Southeast Banking Corporation announced that they were increasing nonperforming loans
in the third quarter of 1990 and reducing or eliminating their dividend (see American Banker, September 24). On September 27 Bank of Boston Corporation
announced that it was reducing its dividend because of worse than expected losses in its commercial real estate loan portfolio; and Event 3: On October 5, 1990,
Travelers Corporation announced that it was reserving $650 million for anticipated losses in its commercial real estate portfolio and reducing its dividend by 33
percent.
Results are reported for Bank of New England Corporation, Bank of Boston Corporation, Chase Manhattan Corporation, Midlantic Corporation, and Southeast
Banking Corporation, Travelers Corporation, and other banking organizations and life insurance companies. The statistics beneath each abnormal return is the Z-
statistics testing the hypothesis that the event parameter is equal to zero. In the columns labeled “Other Banks” and “Other Life Insurance Companies” row
beneath the Z-statistics reports the number of negative abnormal returns, the number of firms in the sample, and the statistic Z testing the hypothesis that ½ of the
abnormal returns are positive. The statistic Z is computed using







where N is the number of firms, G is the number of positive abnormal returns, and p is the probability of a positive abnormal return (1/2).47
Table 4.  Abnormal returns of banking organizations and life insurance companies (continued)
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Table 4.  Abnormal returns of banking organizations and life insurance companies (continued)
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a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.49
Table 4.  Abnormal returns of banking organizations and life insurance companies (continued)
Panel B:  Intra-industry tests of the equivalence of average cumulative abnormal returns across
events






















where ASCAR1 and ASCAR2 are the average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over the period
t=T1 to t=T2, respectively, and  N1 and N2 represent the number of observations in the two portfolios,
respectively.
Events
Difference between other banking organizations and
other life insurance companies cumulative abnormal
returns
Event 1 – Bank of New England nonperforming
loans additions
   1989:1215- 1989:1218
                   -5.67
c
Event 2 – The Comptroller of the Currency
warning; East Coast banking organizations’
dividend reductions and suspensions
1990:0920- 1990:0927
                   -4.14
c
Event 3 – Travelers Corporation’s loan loss
addition and dividend reduction
1990:1005- 1990:1008
                   5.47
c
c Significant at the 1% level50
Table 5. Summary statistics for bank holding companies and life insurance companies (percent of
total assets), 1988 – 1989.
Panel A: Bank holding companies
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Nonresidential
loans 6.90 4.09 0 20.14
Construct loans 4.19 3.35 0 22.27
Book
capitalization 6.56 1.35 1.88 11.89
Panel B: Life insurance companies
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Commercial
mortgage loans 12.66 12.01 0 47.48
Book




3.61 9.41 0 48.1651
Table 6. Correlation of abnormal returns and the financial characteristics of life insurance companies
This table presents estimates of the correlation between the stock market reaction to each financial distress
announcement and selected measures of life insurance companies’ financial condition modeled as:
, jkkj
k
COND ggfe =++ ￿ %
where the financial condition variables (COND) are the ratio of guaranteed investment contracts to total
assets (GIC); the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total assets (CRE); and the ratio of book value of
equity to total assets (CAPITAL). SURPRISE is the cumulative abnormal return over the 22 trading days
ending one day before each event. To account for the possibility of heterokedasticity in the data, all
observations are divided by the standard error of the Ki-day CAR.  This is equivalent to using weighted
least squares to estimate the regression parameters, where the standard error of the firm’s CAR is the
relevant weight.  This standard error is computed as the square root of the sum of the variances of the
prediction error over the Ki days.
The standard error of CAR is given by























































where si,t = standard deviation of the residuals in the market model estimation period, Ti  = number of days
in the estimation period, and  m R = mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period.









The Comptroller of the Currency
















































Adj. R-square 0.0650 0.033 0.2058
F-statistic 2.03 1.05 4.82
c
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.52
Table 6. Correlation of abnormal returns and the financial characteristics of life insurance
companies (continued)
Panel B: Test statistics on the equality of the coefficient estimates over the three events
This panel of the table provides a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are the same for each
of the events. The tests of these pairwise comparisons utilized an F-statistic.











a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.53
Table 7. Correlation of abnormal returns and the financial characteristics of banking organizations
This table presents estimates of the correlation between the stock market reaction to each financial distress
announcement and selected measures of banking firms’ financial condition modeled as:
, jkkj
k
COND ggfe =++ ￿ %
where the financial condition variables (COND) are the ratio of nonresidential real estate loans to total
assets (NONRESIDENTIAL); the ratio of construction loans to total assets (CONSTRUCT); the ratio of
book value of equity to total assets (CAPITAL); an indicator variable for northeastern banking
organizations (NORTHEAST); and an indicator variable for money center and super-regional banking
organizations (BIG BANKS); SURPRISE is the cumulative abnormal return over the 22 trading days
ending one day before each event. To account for the possibility of heterokedasticity in the data, all
observations are divided by the standard error of the Ki-day CAR.  This is equivalent to using weighted
least squares to estimate the regression parameters, where the standard error of the firm’s CAR is the
relevant weight.  This standard error is computed as the square root of the sum of the variances of the
prediction error over the Ki days.  The standard error of CAR is given by























































where si,t = standard deviation of the residuals in the market model estimation period, Ti  = number of days
in the estimation period, and  m R = mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period.









The Comptroller of the Currency





































































a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.54
Table 7. Correlation of abnormal returns and the financial characteristics of banking organizations
 (continued)
Panel B: Test statistics on the equality of the coefficient estimates over the three events
This panel of the table provides a test of the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates are the same for each
of the events. The tests of these pairwise comparisons utilized an F-statistic.
Event 1 vs. Event 2 Event 1 vs. Event 3 Event 2 vs. Event 3













a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.55
Table 8.  Market model cumulative abnormal returns for subsamples of banking organizations and life insurance companies
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for different types of banking organizations and life insurance companies. The different types of banking
organizations are big and non-big banking organizations. Big banking organizations (BIG) are money center and superregional banking organizations. Non-big
banking organizations (NON-BIG) are those firms that are not money center or superregional banking organizations. The different types of life insurance
companies are based on whether a life insurance company has guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) in its liability structure. The statistics beneath each
abnormal return is the Z-statistic. The row beneath the Z-statistics reports the number of firms in each portfolio. To determine whether the difference in abnormal





















where ASCAR1 and ASCAR2 are the average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over the period t=T1 to t=T2, respectively, and  N1 and N2 represent the
number of observations in the two portfolios, respectively.   These results are reported in the columns and rows labeled difference.
Event 1 – Bank of New England
nonperforming loans additions,
1989:1215- 1989:1218
Event 2 – The Comptroller of the




Event 3 – Travelers Corporation’s
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   -3.37
(-18.30)
c
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   -9.17
(-28.10)
c









   [101]
3.87
c
    Northeast   -3.43
 (-7.35)
c
    [13]
   -5.62
(-11.74)
c












    [13]
0.24
(-0.02)
    [18]
    Others  -1.00
(-2.43)
b
   [15]
   -2.88
(-14.72)
c




   [15]
   -9.08
(-25.75)
c








    [83]
Difference -2.64
c -3.14
c -0.68 0.46 0.09 0.7256
Table 8.  Market model cumulative abnormal returns for subsamples of banking organizations and life insurance companies (continued)
Life insurance
companies




   [17]
   -0.58
(-0.89)




















    [39]
-5.33
c
a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.57
Table 9. Pooled cross-section time series estimates of the correlation of abnormal returns and the
financial characteristics of banking and insurance companies
This table provides pooled cross-section time series estimates of the correlation between cumulative
abnormal returns and the financial characteristics of banking and insurance organizations modeled as:
123,, 123 jkBkB
k
EventEventEventCOND ggggf =+++ ￿ %
,,1122 , iLiLBBLj
i
CONDBLBLLB flllh +++++ ￿
where the bank financial condition variables (CONDk,B) are the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total
assets (NONRES); the ratio of construction loans to total assets (CONSTRUCT); the ratio of book value of
equity to total assets (CAPITAL); an indicator variable for money center banking and super-regional
banking organizations (BIG BANKS); and an indicator variable for northeastern banking organizations
other than BIG BANKS (NORTHEAST BANKS). Life insurance financial condition variables (CONDi,L)
are the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total general account assets (CMORT); the ratio of book
value of equity to total general account assets (CAP); and the ratio of life insurance  issuance of guaranteed
investment contracts to total assets(GIC). SURPRISE is the cumulative abnormal return over the 22 trading
days ending one day before each event announcement.  BL1 is an indicator variable for life insurance
companies and bank event 1 - Bank of New England loan loss addition; BL2 is an indicator variable for life
insurance companies and bank event 2 - the Comptroller of the Currency warning; East Coast banking
organizations’ dividend reductions and suspensions; and LB is an indicator variable for banks and event 3 –
Travelers Corporation’s loan loss addition and dividend reduction. Our regression equation also includes
indicator variables for each event (Event1, Event2, and Event3). We suppress the intercept term to avoid the
“dummy variable trap.” By including an intercept term and separate indicator variables for each event, we
would have a problem of perfect multicollinearity, whereby for each observation the sum of the event
indicator variables is equal to one and is perfectly correlated with the intercept term. To avoid this dummy
variable trap, researchers typically omit one of the indicator variables or the intercept term (see Greene,
1997, p.230).  Here, we omit the intercept term. Conditioned on the financial characteristics of banking
organizations, the coefficients on Event1 and Event2 measure the average response of banking
organizations to events 1 and 2, respectively, while conditioned on the financial characteristics of life
insurance companies the coefficient on Event3 measures the average response of life insurance companies.
The coefficient on BL1, lB1, captures the stock market reaction to event 1 of life insurance companies
relative to banking organizations. The coefficient on BL2, lB2, captures the stock market reaction to event 2
of life insurance companies relative to banking organizations. The coefficient on LB, lL, captures the stock
market reaction to event 3 of banking organizations relative to life insurance companies. To account for the
possibility of heterokedasticity in the data, all observations are divided by the standard error of the Ki-day
CAR.  This is equivalent to using weighted least squares to estimate the regression parameters, where the
standard error of the firm’s CAR is the relevant weight.  This standard error is computed as the square root
of the sum of the variances of the prediction error over the Ki days.  The standard error of CAR is given by























































where si,t = standard deviation of the residuals in the market model estimation period, Ti  = number of days
in the estimation period, and  m R = mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period.58
Table 9. Pooled cross-section time series estimates of the correlation of abnormal returns and the
financial characteristics of banking and insurance companies (continued)
Variables Coefficient estimates










































Life insurance response to event 1: Bank of New
England nonperforming loans additions, 1989:1215-
1989:1218
g1 + lB1=-0.0638 + 0.0640=-0.0002
F-statistic =0.00    (p-value =0.9919)
Life insurance response to event 2: The Comptroller of
the Currency warning; East Coast banking
organizations’ dividend reductions and suspensions,
1990:0920- 1990:0927
g2 + lB2 =-0.1464 + 0.0761=-0.0703
F-statistic = 3.86  (p-value = 0.0501)
Bank response to event 3: Travelers Corporation’s loan
loss addition and dividend reduction, 1990:1005-
1990:1008
g3 + lL =-0.0062 + 0.0420=0.0358
F-statistic =2.62    (p-value = 0.1061)
Test: g1 + lB1=g3 + lL
F-statistic =1.61    (p-value = 0.2045)
Test: Event2+ BANK EVENT2-LIFE REACTION
=Event3+ LIFE EVENT-BANK REACTION
(g2 + lB2=g3 + lL)
F-statistic =6.01    (p-value = 0.0145)
Test: Bank response to bank events vs. Life response to
bank events
Event 1: Bank of New England nonperforming loans
additions, 1989:1215- 1989:1218
Event1= Event1 +BANK EVENT1-LIFE REACTION
Coefficient estimate=0.0640
T-statistic=3.18 (p-value =0.0016)
Event 2: The Comptroller of the Currency warning; East
Coast banking organizations’ dividend reductions and
suspensions, 1990:0920- 1990:0927
Event2= Event2 +BANK EVENT2-LIFE REACTION
Coefficient estimate=0.0761
T-statistic=1.29 (p-value=0.1972)
Event 3:Travelers Corporation’s loan loss addition and
dividend reduction, 1990:1005- 1990:1008
Test: Event3+ LIFE EVENT-BANK REACTION=Event3
Coefficient estimate=0.0420
T-statistic=2.15 (p-value=0.0317)59
Table 9. Pooled cross-section time series estimates of the correlation of abnormal returns and the


































BANK EVENT1 - LIFE REACTION 0.0640
(3.18)
c
BANK EVENT2 - LIFE REACTION 0.0761
(1.29)






a,b,c Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.1
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